In this paper, we study the problem of learning the set of pure strategy Nash equilibria and the exact structure of a continuous-action graphical game with quadratic payoffs by observing a small set of perturbed equilibria. A continuous-action graphical game can possibly have an uncountable set of Nash euqilibria. We propose a ℓ 12´b lock regularized method which recovers a graphical game, whose Nash equilibria are the ǫ-Nash equilibria of the game from which the data was generated (true game). Under a slightly stringent condition on the parameters of the true game, our method recovers the exact structure of the graphical game. Our method has a logarithmic sample complexity with respect to the number of players. It also runs in polynomial time.
INTRODUCTION
The real world is filled with scenarios which arise due to competitive actions by selfish individual players who are trying to maximize their own utilities or payoffs. Non-cooperative game theory has been considered as the appropriate mathematical framework to formally study strategic behavior in such multi-agent scenarios. In such scenarios, each agent decides its action based on the actions of other players. The core solution concept of Nash equilibrium (NE) [24] serves a descriptive role of the stable outcome of the overall behavior of self-interested agents (e.g., people, companies, governments, groups or autonomous systems) interacting strategically with each other in distributed settings.
Graphical Games. The introduction of compact representations to game theory over the last two decades have extended algorithmic game theory's potential for large-scale, practical applications often encountered in the real world. Introduced within the AI community about two decades ago, graphical games [21] constitute an example of one of the first and arguably one of the most influential graphical models for game theory. Indeed, graphical games played a prominent role in establishing the computational complexity of computing NE in normal-form games as well as in succinctly representable multiplayer games (see, e.g., [9, 10, 11] and the references therein).
Players can take actions in either a discrete space (for example in voting) or in a continuous space (for example in simultaneous auctions in online advertising). Correspondingly, graphical games can be studied in both domains. In this paper, we focus on continuous-action graphical games.
Inference in Graphical Games. There has been considerable progress on computing classical equilibrium solution concepts such as NE and correlated equilibria [2] in graphical games (see, e.g., [5, 21, 20, 26, 27, 34] and the references therein) as well as on computing the price of anarchy in graphical games (see, e.g., [4] ). [19] identified the most influential players, i.e., a small set of players whose collective behavior forces every other player to a unique choice of action. All the work above focus on inference problems for graphical games, and fall in the field of algorithmic game theory.
Learning Graphical Games. The aforementioned problems of computing Nash equilibrium, correlated equilibrium or price of anarchy often assume that the structure and payoffs of the games under consideration are already available. Relatively less attention has been paid to the problem of learning both the structure and payoffs of graphical games from data. Addressing this problem is essential to the development, potential use and success of game-theoretic models in practical applications. In this paper, we study the problem of learning the complete characterization of pure strategy Nash equilibrium and structure of the graph in a continuous-action graphical game.
Related Work. There has been considerable amount of work done for learning games in the discrete-action setting. [18] proposed a maximum-likelihood approach to learn linear influence games -a class of parametric graphical games with binary actions and linear payoffs. However, their method runs in exponential time and the authors assumed a specific observation model for the strategy profiles. For the same specific observation model, [15] proposed a polynomial time algorithm, based on ℓ 1 -regularized logistic regression, for learning linear influence games. Their strategy profiles (or joint actions) were drawn from a mixture of uniform distributions: one over the pure-strategy Nash equilibria (PSNE) set, and the other over its complement. [16] obtained necessary and sufficient conditions for learning linear influence games under arbitrary observation model. [14] use a discriminative, max-margin based approach, to learn tree structured polymatrix games 1 . Their method runs in exponential time and the authors show that learning polymatrix games is NP-hard under this max-margin setting, even when the class of graphs is restricted to trees. Finally, [17] proposed a polynomial time algorithm for learning sparse polymatrix games in the discrete-action setting.
Regarding inference for continuous-action games, [12] and [32] provide a survey of variational inequality methods and Gauss-Seidel methods to compute generalized Nash equilibrium for pure strategy games. [28] and [29] studied a mixed-strategy actor-critic algorithm which converges to a probability distribution that assigns most weight to equilibrium states. [23] provided sufficient conditions under which no-regret learning converges to equilibrium.
Continuous-action games with quadratic payoffs have been used extensively in the game theory literature [3, 7, 13, 1] . [22] proposed algorithms to learn games with quadratic payoffs, in a simplified setting. However, the authors do not provide any theoretical guarantees. In this work, we focus on provable guarantees for a far more general class of games with quadratic payoffs in the highdimensional regime.
Our Contribution. We aim to propose a novel method to learn graphical games with quadratic payoffs, with the following provable guarantees in mind: 1. Correctness -We want to develop a method which correctly recovers the set of Nash equilibria and the structure of the graphical games. 2. Computational efficiency -Our method must run fast enough to handle the high dimensional cases. Ideally, we want to have polynomial time complexity with respect to the number of players. 3. Sample complexity -We would like to use as few samples as possible for recovering the set of Nash equilibria. We want to achieve logarithmic sample complexity with respect to the number of players.
To this end, we propose a block-norm regularized method to learn graphical games with quadratic payoff functions. For n players, at most d in-neighbors per player, and k-dimensional action vectors, we show that Opk 5 d 3 logpdnkqq samples are sufficient to recover the complete characterization of the set of ǫ-Nash equilibria. Under slightly more stringent conditions, we also recover the true structure of the game. Our method also runs in polynomial time complexity.
Regarding the main challenges that we address, first, the set of Nash equilibria for continuousaction games is uncountable, while for discrete-action games is countable. Our method provides the complete characterization of such uncountable sets. Our method is also oblivious to the exact process under which players converge to Nash equilibria. In fact, Nash equilibria can be "chosen" by nature in an arbitrary non-probabilistic fashion. We also do not assume any particular process that "chooses" Nash equilibria, such as, for instance, a stochastic process. Our method only needs access to some small number perturbed equilibria.
PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we introduce our notation and formally define the problem of learning graphical games with quadratic utility functions. Consider a directed graph GpV, Eq, where V and E are set of vertices and edges respectively. We define V fi t1, . . . , nu, where each vertex corresponds to one player. We denote the in-neighbors of a player i by S i , i.e., S i " tj | pj, iq P Eu (i.e., the set of nodes that point to node i in the graph). All the other players are denoted by S c i , i.e., S c i " t1, . . . , nuzpS i Y iq. Let |S i | ď d and |S c i | ď n. For each player i P V, there is a set of actions or pure-strategies A i . That is, player i can take action x i P A i . Each action x i consists of making k decisions on a limited budget b P R. We consider games with continuous actions. Mathematically, x i P R k and }x i } 2 ď b. For each player i, there is also a local payoff function u i : A iˆp Ś jPS i A j q Ñ R mapping the joint action of player i and its in-neighbors S i , to a real number. Later, we will define a particular kind of local payoff function which is of our interest. A joint action x˚P Ś iPV A i is a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium (PSNE) of a graphical game iff, no player i has any incentive to unilaterally deviate from the prescribed action xi P A i , given the joint action of its in-neighbors xS i P Ś jPS i A j in the equilibrium. We denote a game by G , and the set of all PSNE and ǫ-PSNE of G , by NEpG q and NE ǫ pG q respectively, for a constant ǫ ą 0. Formally,
Parametric Payoffs. We are interested in solving a parametrized version of the problem. In that, given the weights Wi j P R kˆk , @i, j P V, for each player i, we define the set of in-neighbors of player i as S i " tj | Wi j ‰ 0u and the payoff function
Consider max x i u i px i , xS i q " 0, @i P t1, . . . , nu, then in a PSNE, each player i matches their action x i to the weighted actions of their neighbors, i.e., ř jPS i Wi j xj . Let ǫ ą 0 be a constant. The set of all ǫ-PSNE of G is
Sampling. Given the above characterization, the set of ǫ-PSNE is a convex polytope. We observe samples from the set of noisy PSNE which follow a local noise mechanism that adds noise independently per player. Observed joint actions
where x˚is a Nash equilibrium, that is x˚P NEpG q and e is independent zero mean sub-Gaussian noise with variance proxy σ 2 . The class of sub-Gaussian variates includes for instance Gaussian variables, any bounded random variable (e.g. Bernoulli, multinomial, uniform), any random variable with strictly log-concave density, and any finite mixture of sub-Gaussian variables.
Norms and Notations. For a matrix A P R pˆq and two sets S Ď t1, . . . , pu and T Ď t1, . . . , qu, A ST denotes A restricted to rows in S and columns in T . Similarly, A S. and A .T are row and column restricted matrices respectively. For a vector m P R q , the ℓ 8 -norm is defined as }m} 8 " max iPt1,...,pu |m i |. The Frobenius norm for a matrix A P R pˆq is defined as
The ℓ 8 -operator norm for A is defined as
The spectral norm of A is defined as
We also define a block matrix norm for row-partitioned block matrices. Let A P R ř k i"1 p iˆq , @i P t1, . . . , ku be a row-partitioned block matrix defined as follows:
MAIN RESULT
In this section, we describe our main theoretical results. But before we do that, we discuss some technical assumptions which are needed for our proofs.
Assumption 1 (Budgeted actions). For all x i P A i , }x i } 2 ď b, @i P t1, . . . , nu for some b ą 0.
Assumption 2 (Maximum zero utility). At PSNE, u i pxi , xi q " 0, @i P t1, . . . , nu.
Assumption 1 simply states that each player has a limited budget to allocate for its actions. For instance, consider simultaneous auctions in an online advertising, where a company chooses how to allocate its budget into several options. For a sufficiently large budget b, Assumption 2 is not difficult to fulfill for quadratic payoffs. We propose a mutual incoherence assumption (Assumption 3) for games. While mutual incoherence is new to graphical games, it has been a standard assumption in various estimation problems such as compressed sensing [35] , Markov random fields [31] , non-parametric regression [30] , diffusion networks [8] , among others. Now that all our assumptions are in place, we are ready to setup our estimation problem. Consider that we have access to T perturbed equilibria, i.e., we have access to x t i " xi t`et i where superscript t denotes the t-th sample and e t i P R k is a vector of zero-mean mutually independent sub-Gaussian noises with variance proxy σ 2 . We estimate the parameters W ij for each i, j P t1, . . . , nu by solving the following optimization problem:
where W i¨d enotes the collection of all W ij , @j P t1, . . . , nu, j ‰ i. Our next theorem states that the recoveredŴ i. completely characterizes the set of all ǫ-Nash equilibria.
Theorem 1. Consider a continuous-action graphical game G such that Assumptions 1, 2 and 3 are satisfied for each player. Let λ ą maxp24
q, then the following claims hold.
1. We can recover NE ǫ pG q by estimating W from the optimization problem (1).
Furthermore, for each player
then we recover the exact structure of the graphical game G .
where C min is the minimum eigenvalue of
Proof. We will make use of the primal-dual witness method to prove Theorem 1. By using the definition of Frobenious norm, optimization problem (1) can be equivalently written aŝ
Consider the term sup }Z ij } F ď1 xZ ij , W ij y. We can assign specific values to Z ij to get the maximum possible value of xZ ij , W ij y. In particular, we can take if W ij ‰ 0 then Z ij "
Note that in the first case }Z ij } F " 1 and thus it gives the maximum value for xZ ij , W ij y and no further improvement is possible. In the second case, since W ij " 0, Z ij can take any value such that }Z ij } F ď 1 without affecting xZ ij , W ij y. We fix Z ij to one such value and rewrite equation (2) aŝ
where the last equality comes by keeping in mind that Z ij are chosen as described above. We can rewrite equation (3) as,
Using the stationarity Karush-Kuhn-Tucker condition at the optimum, for each W ij we can write,
j where e t i , e t j P R k are zero mean sub-Gaussian vectors with variance proxy σ 2 . Therefore, x t i can be written as a function of Wi j , x t j , e t i and e t j . Thus, by substituting x t i and writing the system of equations in vector form, we get
where
. . 
with Wi¨, W i¨, Z i¨P R pn´1qkˆk and x t -i , e t -i P R pn´1qkˆ1 . If we denote in-neighbors of i by a set S i then Wi j ⊺ " 0 for all j R S i . We assume that W ij ⊺ " 0 for all j R S i . This choice will be justified later. Thus, the stationarity condition can be written as,
Equation (7) can be decomposed in two separate equations. One for the players in S i and other for players not in S i which we denote by S c i .
LetÊ`.˘denote the empirical expectation. Then equation (8) can be written as,
Before we move ahead, we provide some properties of the finite-sample regime which hold with high probability. The detailed proofs of these lemmas are available in Appendix A. We definê
Next, we show that the mutual incoherence condition also holds in the finite-sample regime with high probability.
Now we can use Lemma 1 and 2 to prove our main result. We can rewrite equation (10) as,
11)
This is possible because
Using equation (11), we can write equation (9) as,
By taking the B, 8, F-norm on both sides and using the norm triangle inequality,
Using the inequality }AB} B,8,F ď }A} B,8,1 }B} 8,2 form Lemma 10, we get
Again using the norm triangle inequality,
Next, we provide some technical lemmas (detailed proofs in Appendix A) to bound all the terms in right hand side of equation (13).
. For some ǫ 1 ą 0, 0 ă ǫ 2 ă 8 and ǫ 3 ă 8 ?
Lemma 4 (Bound on }Ê`"x -i ‰ S i¨e i ⊺˘} 8,2 ). For some ǫ 4 ą 0 and ǫ 5 ă 8 ?
For some ǫ 6 ą 0, 0 ă ǫ 7 ă 8 and ǫ 8 ă 8 ?
. For some ǫ 9 ą 0 and ǫ 10 ă 8kσ 2 ,
Recall that,
We already showed that mutual incoherence holds in the finite-sample regime, i.e., }M} B,8,1 ď 1´α for some 0 ă α ă 1. Also note that } " Z i¨‰ S i¨} 8,2 ď 1. It follows that,
Using bounds from Lemmas 3, 4, 5, and 6, we get
where,
If these conditions hold, then
After rearranging the terms, we get,
Choice of λ. To keep the RHS of equation (19) less than λ 2 , we need to set ǫ 1 ă αλ 24p1´αq , ǫ 2 ă αλ 24p1´αqσ 2 ?
24σ 2 k max ij |W ij | , ǫ 9 ă αλ 24 and ǫ 10 ă αλ 24 . We also want to make sure that claim in Lemma 3, 4, 5 and 6 hold with high probability. This can be achieved by keeping a λ such that λ ą maxp24
?
with high probability which in turn ensures that W ij are zero for all j P S c i with high probability. Now,
20)
By taking the B, 8, F-norm on both sides,
Using the norm triangle inequality,
Using the inequality }AB} B,8,F ď }A} B,8,1 }B} 8,2 from Lemma 10, we get
Using the inequality }A} B,8,1 ď k}A} 8, 8 , where k is the maximum number of rows in a block of A, we obtain
Since }A} 8,8 ď ? p}A} 2,2 for A P R pˆp ,
Using results from Lemma 3 and 4, with high probability,
Substituting bounds on ǫ 1 , ǫ 2 , ǫ 3 , ǫ 4 and ǫ 5 , we get
Now, we will characterize NE ǫ pG q by W i¨. In particular, we define
We explicitly compute the payoffs to prove that equation (21) indeed recovers NE ǫ pG q, i.e., for all x˚P NE ǫ pG q
Thus the set defined in equation (21) recovers ǫ-PSNE for ǫ " |S i |δpk, |S i |, C min , α, λ, σ, W max qb.
Next, we show that if for each player i P t1, . . . , nu, if min jPS i }Wi j } F ą 2δpk, |S i |, C min , α, λ, σ, W max q then we recover the exact structure of the graphical game. Note that if min jPS i }Wi j } F ą 2δpk, |S i |, C min , α, λ, σ, W max q then }Wi j } F ą 0 implies that }W ij } F ą 0. We have already shown that we do not recover any extra player in the set of in-neighbors S i and this added condition ensures that for all the players in S i , }W ij } F ą 0. Thus, we recover exact set of players in S i for each player i P t1, . . . , nu. We recover the exact graphical game by combining the results for all the players.
Sample and Time Complexity. If we have T ą Opk 5 |S i | 3 logpk|S c i ||S i |qq and all other conditions mentioned in Theorem 1 are satisfied for every player then all our high probability statements are valid for every player i. Taking a union bound over n players only adds a factor of log n. Thus the sample complexity for our method is Opk 5 |S i | 3 logpk|S c i ||S i |qq. As for the time complexity, we can formulate the block-regularized multi-variate regression problem as a second order cone programing problem [25] which can be solved in polynomial time by interior point methods [6] .
Concluding Remarks. There are two possible future directions for our work. First, it would be interesting to see if the exact Nash equilibria set can be recovered for graphical games with quadratic payoffs using our method. Second, it would be interesting to extend our method to the continuous-action games with more general payoff functions. Proof. We prove the lemma in two steps. First, recall that H " 1
A Proofs of Theorems and Lemmas
Using the inequality Λ min pA`Bq ě Λ min pAq`Λ min pBq
Last inequality follows by noting that 1
q is a positive semi-definite matrix with non-negative eigenvalues. Next, we prove that if T ą OOp 1 σ 2 maxpb 2 , 1 σ 2 qk|S i |q, then Λ min p "Ĥ‰ S i S i q ą 0 with high probability.
q is a positive semidefinite matrix ě min
Notice that R is a sub-Gaussian random variable with mean 0 and parameter
Following ǫ-nets argument from [33] and covariance matrix concentration for sub-Gaussian random variables, we can write Prp min
and Prp min
Thus, choosing ǫ " σ 2 4 and choosing T " Op 1
A.2 Proof of Lemma 2
First, we prove a technical lemma that will be used in Lemma 2.
Lemma 7. For any δ ą 0, the following holds:
Prp} "Ĥ‰
Using the union bound over @i P S c i , j P indpiq, @l P S i , k P indplq we can write,
Similarly we can prove equation (25),
Now we prove equation (26) . Note that,
Note that, PrpΛ min p "Ĥ‰
Furthermore,
, we get:
Now, we provide the detailed proof of Lemma 2. 
Controlling the third term of equation (28) . We can write }T 3 } B,8,1 as,
Using equation (24) and (26) both with δ " a α 6 , we get
Putting everything together we get,
which approaches 1 as long as we have N ą Opk 5 d 3 log nkq
For some ǫ 1 ą 0, 0 ă ǫ 2 ă 8 and ǫ 3 ă 8 ?
Proof. Note that,
Again, we will bound both terms separately.
W˚P R |S i |kˆk . We define a random variable R and then,
31)
For a given y t i˚, @t P t1, . . . , T u, R is a sub-Gaussian random variable with 0 mean and parameter
. Thus, for some ǫ 1 ą 0, we can use a tail bound on a sub-Gaussian random variable:
where last inequality holds because yi t ď b, @t P t1, . . . , T u. Therefore,
Taking union bound across i P indplq, @l P S i and j P t1, . . . , ku, we get
W˚P R |S i |kˆk .We define a random variable R and then,
35)
Or for some
Combining the bounds on R 1 and R 2 and taking a union bound, we get
Taking one sided union bound across i P indplq, @l P S i and j P t1, . . . , ku, we get 
Thus,
We will bound both the terms separately.
y˚P R |S i |kˆ1 and e i " u P R k and we define a random variable R R fiÊ`y˚u ⊺˘i
Then for a given y t i1 , random variable R t is a sub-Gaussian random variable with 0 mean and parameter y t i1 2 σ 2 T 2 . Correspondingly R is a sub-Gaussian random variable with 0 mean and parameter σ 2
. Using the tail bound for the sub-Gaussian variable for some ǫ 4 ą 0, we can write
where last inequality follows by noting that y t i1 2 ď b 2 . Thus, Prp|Ê`y˚u ⊺˘i j |ą ǫ 4 q " E y t i1`P r .|y t i1 p|Ê`y˚u ⊺˘i j |ą ǫ 4 qď 2 expp´ǫ
v P R |S i |kˆ1 and e i " u P R k and we define a random variable R R fiÊ`vu ⊺˘i
Note that v t i1 and u t j are independent sub-Gaussian random variables with 0 mean and σ 2 parameter. We will use Lemma 9 to get a tail bound on the random variable R. Now, E`R˘" 0 and for some ǫ 5 ą 0,
Here v t i1 σ and u t j σ are sub-Gaussian random variables with parameter 1. Thus using result from Lemma 9, we can use a Bernstein tail bound for the sum of sub-exponential random variables and write, Proof. Note that,
B Proofs of Auxiliary Lemmas B.1 Subexponentiality of square of sub-Gaussian random variables Lemma 8. If y is a sub-Gaussian random variable with 0 mean and parameter 1, then y 2 is a sub-exponential random variable with parameters p4 ? 2, 4q.
Proof. Since y is a 0 mean sub-Gaussian random variable with parameter 1, we can write p@λ P RqE`exppλyq˘ď expp λ 2 2 q
Let Γprq be the Gamma function, then moments of the sub-Gaussian variable y are bounded as follows:
p@r ě 0qE`|y| r˘ď r2 r 2 Γp r 2 q
Let v fi y 2 and µ v fi E`v˘. Using power series expansion and noting that Γprq " pr´1q! for an integer r, we have: E`exppλpv´µ v qq˘" 1`λE`v´µ v˘`8 ÿ It follows that v " y 2 is a subexponential random variable with parameters p4 ? 2, 4q.
B.2 Subexponentiality of product of independent sub-Gaussian random variables Lemma 9. Let p and q be two independent sub-Gaussian random variables with 0 mean and parameter 1, then pq is a sub-exponential random variable with parameters p4 ? 2, 4q.
Proof. Let vecp.q be an operator which flattens the matrix and converts it to a vector. Let Y be a row-partitioned block matrix with same size and block structure as A. We follow a similar procedure for the last norm inequality. 
